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We extend agency theory to propose that structural reform positively impacts firm profitability in 
developing countries because the improvements in external monitoring that accompany structural 
reform decrease the agency costs faced by firms. However, we also argue that not all firms 
benefit equally from structural reform because their agency problems are impacted differently. 
Hence, we propose that structural reform results in higher improvements in profitability for 
domestic state-owned and domestic private firms than it does for subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
Results of the analyses of the largest 500 firms in Latin America support the arguments, 
suggesting that, contrary to the views of many critics of globalization, domestic firms are the 
main beneficiaries of structural reform in developing countries.  
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The benefits of structural reform in developing countries are under debate (Bhagwati, 
2004; Guillen, 2001; Henisz, Zelner, & Guillen, 2005; Stiglitz, 2003). In developing countries, 
structural reform involves a reduction of government intervention in the economy and 
improvement in national governance (Williamson, 2004). Critics of globalization in general and 
structural reform in particular argue that the main beneficiaries of structural reform in developing 
countries are foreign firms, often at the expense of domestic companies (Mander & Goldsmith, 
1996). However, there is little evidence to support or dismiss this view. Evidence on the impact 
of structural reform on firms is limited and conflicting. Single-country studies find that, in the 
aftermath of structural reform, firms have improved productivity (e.g., Amann & Nixson, 1999), 
strengthened technology (e.g., Katrak, 2002), and increased performance (e.g., Appiah-Adu, 
1999). However, other studies do not find improvements in productivity (e.g., Salim, 2003), 
technology (e.g., Katrak, 2000), or performance (e.g., Okorafo, 1993).  
The objective of this paper is to clarify the debate by analyzing how structural reform 
impacts firm profitability in developing countries. In examining this question, we extend the 
boundaries of agency theory (Ross, 1973) to argue that the improvements in external monitoring 
that accompany structural reform lead to a reduction in agency costs, which increases efficiency 
and, subsequently, improves firm profitability. We also argue that not all firms benefit equally 
from structural reform because their agency problems are impacted differently. Thus, contrary to 
the views of critics of globalization, we propose that domestic state-owned and domestic private 
firms, rather than subsidiaries of foreign firms, are the main beneficiaries of structural reform. 
The analyses of the largest 500 firms in Latin America support these arguments. 
Although the analyses do not test the mediating mechanisms directly, they show that structural 
reform has a positive impact on firm profitability, and that this positive impact is higher for    2 
 
domestic state-owned firms, followed by domestic private firms, and finally, by subsidiaries of 
foreign firms.   
This paper contributes to agency theory by taking a broader view of the theory and 
discussing a new source of changes in agency costs. Traditionally, agency studies have focused 
on analyzing the internal mechanisms that solve the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers (for a review see Becht, Bolton, & Roell, 2003) and have argued that agency costs 
vary with changes in ownership (for a review see Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, & Udell, 2005). 
Here we take a different route by proposing that agency costs are affected by the institutional 
environment of the firm and that they diminish with structural reform without the need for 
changes in ownership. Thus, these ideas help explain the counterintuitive idea that structural 
reform results in improved profitability for firms in developing countries. We push the 
theoretical boundary further by arguing not only that firms vary in their agency costs, as 
traditionally discussed in the literature, but that firms also vary in how their agency costs are 
affected by structural reform. This idea explains the differences in profitability improvements 
across firms, with domestic firms rather than subsidiaries of foreign firms being the main 
beneficiaries of structural reform.  
The arguments also contribute to a better understanding of the debate on the impact of 
globalization on developing country firms (Guillen, 2001; Henisz, Zelner, & Guillen, 2005). We 
propose that analyses of the benefits of structural reform need to be more nuanced, studying not 
only whether structural reform is beneficial but also what types of firms benefit from it. 
Although the intellectual lineage of structural reform dates back to Adam Smith (1776) 
and was kept alive by authors like von Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1962), who proposed that 
limitations on governments facilitate growth by allowing the ingenuity and entrepreneurial spirit    3 
 
of individuals to flourish, this idea had limited influence during most of the 20
th century. 
Governments throughout the world actively controlled the economy. In developed capitalist 
countries, influenced by the ideas of Keynes (1936), they established restraints on markets. In 
communist countries, influenced by the ideas of Marx and Engels (1848), they established a 
centrally planned system and state ownership of factors of production. In developing countries 
they actively intervened in the economy to speed up industrialization (Sachs & Warner, 1995). 
Moreover, in Latin America and in parts of Asia and Africa, influenced by dependency theory 
(Prebisch, 1950), they implemented import substitution, restricting imports and operations of 
foreign firms to support the development of indigenous firms (Bruton, 1998). 
Governments continued to control the economy until the 1970s, when stagflation forced 
policymakers to rethink their intervention (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). In the mid-1970s, Chile, 
under the Pinochet dictatorship, was the first country to implement structural reform, and grew as 
a result. However, other developing countries did not follow this example because an association 
was established between structural reform and a totalitarian regime. Nevertheless, the debt crisis 
of 1982 that spread throughout Latin America forced governments to rethink their position. In 
the mid-1980s, Bolivia, which was a democracy, undertook structural reform and successfully 
tackled hyperinflation. It became an example that it was possible to apply structural reform 
without a strongman. As a result, other countries in Latin America and the developing world 
implemented similar reforms. 
Structural reform - which is often referred to as the Washington Consensus - represents a 
set of prescribed policies for economic reform to achieve rapid growth in developing countries. 
Williamson (1990) coined the term Washington Consensus to refer to the desirable policies for 
reform in Latin America, which were perceived as being dominant in Washington, D.C., where    4 
 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Government are based. Although 
Williamson’s original intent was to persuade policymakers that Latin America was indeed 
engaged in serious reform (Williamson, 2000), the term came to be used as a prescription for 
development and as a way to solve the ailments of developing countries in general (Williamson, 
2004). The original reforms prescribed the reduction of government intervention in the economy 
through reforms such as deregulation, liberalization, and privatization, and were later revised to 
also include improvements in national governance (Rodrik, 2006; Williamson, 2004).  
Structural reform helped developing countries achieve stability, but by the late 1990s 
doubts about the benefits of structural reform began to emerge, particularly in Latin America. 
Many countries had started with rapid reforms in multiple areas to address the economic malaise 
of the 1980s, using a so-called “shock therapy” (Sachs & Warner, 1995). These reforms resulted 
in countries regaining macroeconomic stability and economic growth, which benefited the 
population (Kuzynski & Williamson, 2003). For example, between 1990 and 2006, the 
proportion of people living in poverty as a percentage of the total population in Latin America 
diminished from 48.3% to 36.5% (ECLAC, 2007). However, skeptics point out that growth has 
been uneven and limited, and they doubt the true impact of structural reforms on growth (Fraga, 
2004; Katz, 2004; Escaith & Morley, 2000). Some countries even experienced deep but brief 
economic crises, such as Mexico in 1995, Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2001. Defenders of 
structural reform counter by arguing that reforms were not always consistently implemented. 
Some countries implemented reforms rapidly while others took a gradual approach; certain 
countries implemented most of the reforms while others took a more piecemeal approach. These 
differences have resulted in different degrees of progress towards growth and development 
(Kuzcynski & Williamson, 2003).     5 
 
There has been opposition to the reforms. Some policymakers deemed it beneficial for 
them to blame the Washington Consensus for the ailments of the country rather than accept 
responsibility for the incorrect application of its prescriptions (Lora, Panizza, & Quispe-Agnoli, 
2004; Ocampo, 2004). Some governments even backtracked from reforms for ideological or 
practical reasons. For example, Argentina imposed price controls in the early 2000s, and 
Venezuela nationalized petroleum fields in the mid-2000s. Moreover, although there has been 
managerial support for the reforms, some firms pressured the government to slow down or 
reverse their implementation. A Costa Rican agriculture businessman summarized the view that 
the reforms were to stay: “Today we accept the commercial opening and the need to be more 
competitive as part of a global trend that, although some in our countries are trying to delay, 
cannot be stopped” (Colburn & Sanchez, 2000: 59). However, firms with tight connections to the 
government suffer from the severance of these connections as a result of the reforms (Fisman, 
2001; Krueger, 1974) and will adopt political strategies to protect themselves from additional 
competition (Bonardi, 2004; Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005). A Guatemalan civil servant 
explained the opposition to reform: “Few can imagine the strength with which the private sector 
pressures the Central Bank, the government’s economic team, and even the President so that they 
reinstate or do not remove the protection against the arrival of new competition from abroad” 
(Colburn & Sanchez, 2000: 62).  
This discussion indicates that the debate concerning the benefits of structural reform 
appears to require more nuanced analyses, especially at the firm level. For example, structural 
reform appears to have induced firms to improve productivity (Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, & 
Kugler, 2004), to become multinational firms (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007, 2008; Guillen, 2005), and 
to have facilitated investments, but weak institutions limited the benefits from such investments    6 
 
(Moguillansky & Bielschowsky 2000). Therefore, we contribute to these studies by analyzing 
how and which types of firms benefit from structural reform.  
Theoretical Bases for Analyzing Structural Reform and Firm Profitability 
Agency theory focuses on the problems of managing collaboration among economic 
actors (Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory can be applied to any relationship between two parties 
where one of these, the agent, acts on behalf of or as a representative of the other, the principal, 
in making a decision (Ross, 1973: 134). Agency problems emerge from differences in objectives 
and attitudes towards risk between the principal and agent (Ross, 1973). Rational self-interested 
behavior, information asymmetry, imperfect monitoring, bounded rationality, and opportunism 
give rise to agency costs in the relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
  Although most researchers associate agency theory with the study of relationships 
between owners and managers (for reviews see Becht, Bolton, & Roell, 2003, and Daily, Dalton 
& Cannella, 2003), the theory can be used to explain other relationships where principals require 
the assistance of agents (Ross, 1973; for a review see Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989). These include 
relationships between bondholders, shareholders, and managers (e.g., Harris & Raviv, 1991); 
superiors and subordinates (for reviews see Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, and Predergast, 1999); a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) and its subsidiaries (e.g., Roth & O’Donnell, 1996); the firm and 
its distribution channels (e.g., Lassar & Kerr, 1996); the firm and its suppliers (e.g., Camuffo, 
Furlan, & Rettore, 2007); the firm and its alliance partners (e.g., Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006); and 
the firm and its acquisitions (e.g., Wright, Kroll, Lado, & van Ness, 2002). The theory has even 
been applied to analyze relationships among interest groups, agencies, and the government (e.g., 
Spiller, 1990), and entire economic systems (e.g., Aoki, 1990).    7 
 
Most analyses of changes in agency costs have focused on those arising from changes in 
ownership (for a review see Berger et al., 2005), such as when the firm changes from state to 
private ownership (e.g., Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000), or when it changes from being 
quoted in the stock market to being privately held (e.g., Phan & Hill, 1995).  
We extend the theory to argue that agency costs may also vary with changes in the 
institutional environment, structural reform in particular. North (1990: 3) defines institutions as 
“the rules of the game in a society … the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (p. 3). Structural reform represents an important type of institutional change by 
which the laws and regulations of a country are altered to improve the functioning of the market 
(Williamson, 1990, 2004). Thus, as we discuss in more detail below, structural reform improves 
monitoring of managers and reduces agency costs, helping firms improve profitability. In this 
manner, agency costs may change without the need to alter the ownership of the firm.  
The model we describe below is subject to some boundary conditions. First, the model 
examines the general impact of the overall structural reform on firm profitability. Structural 
reform has multiple dimensions that complement and reinforce each other’s influence because 
they are part of a system (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Thus, the arguments presented below 
emerge from the interaction among the dimensions. This approach complements other research 
that has focused on the impact of individual dimensions of structural reform on firms (e.g. Hay, 
2001; Kim & Prescott, 2005; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Mitton, 2006). Second, the model 
explains the behavior of firms in developing capitalist countries, where state-owned, private, and 
foreign firms coexisted before and throughout the implementation of structural reform. This 
complements studies of firms in transition economies, where private firms did not exist before 
the transition, and hence are likely to behave differently (for reviews see Peng & Heath, 1996,    8 
 
and Meyer, 2001). Third, the model explains the behavior of firms in developing countries, 
where structural reform involves both the reduction of government intervention in the economy 
and improvements in national governance (Williamson, 2004). This complements studies of 
firms in developed countries, which have well established institutions and where structural 
reform consists primarily of economic deregulation (for a review see Winston, 1993). Fourth, the 
model applies to large firms which can more easily choose alternative strategies and survive 
structural reform (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Small firms have fewer strategic choices and face 
more serious survival challenges (Mata & Portugal, 2004). Fifth, the model studies the impact of 
structural reform on the agency costs of three types of firms based on their majority ownership: 
domestic state-owned, domestic private, and subsidiaries of foreign firms. We do not study how 
agency costs vary with changes in ownership because this has been widely studied in previous 
literature. Hence, we do not include privatized firms as a separate category because they 
represents a change from one of our three firm types (i.e., domestic state firms) to one of the 
other two (i.e., domestic private firms or subsidiaries of foreign firms). As such, based on our 
categorization, privatized firms are not a type of firm, but a change from one of the types to the 
others. Its change in agency costs and profitability have been widely studied (e.g. Boubakri, 
Cosset, & Guedhami, 2005; D'Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2005; for reviews see Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000, and Megginson & Netter, 2001). Nevertheless, because of the relevance of 
privatization as part of structural reform we control for its influence in the analysis. 
The Impact of Structural Reform on Firm Profitability 
We argue that structural reform tends to have a positive impact on firm profitability for 
firms in general. Although most analyses of agency theory focus on internal mechanisms that 
reduce agency costs in the relationship between shareholders and managers, such as contract    9 
 
design, incentive systems, or internal controls (for reviews see Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989; 
Prendergast, 1999), the theory also considers external mechanisms that help reduce agency costs: 
labor, capital, and product markets (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Unfortunately, the role 
of these external monitoring mechanisms in monitoring managers has tended to be overlooked, 
with the exception of capital markets (Jensen, 1993; Walsh & Seward, 1990). We study these 
external mechanisms, which form part of the country’s institutions, and discuss how structural 
reform, by improving the functioning of these markets, helps not only reduce the agency costs of 
monitoring and restraining managerial misbehavior, resulting in improved efficiency, but also 
provide additional incentives, resulting in higher productivity. As a result, firms experience 
increased profitability.  
The market for managers acts as a control on managerial misbehavior (Fama, 1980). 
Managers face competition not only from alternative managerial teams that may replace the 
managers if profitability is not high, but also from managers in the firm who may replace their 
superiors if the firm is not profitable (Fama, 1980). Structural reform lifts the strict limitations on 
the hiring and firing of personnel that previously had minimized the pressure of the labor market 
on managers. As firing and hiring becomes easier, a more competitive market for managers 
emerges, with talent becoming more mobile, putting pressure on and helping firms improve their 
managerial teams. For example, Juan Navarro, CEO of Exxel, an Argentinean private equity firm 
created in 1992, discussed how the main source of value creation in Supermercados Norte, an 
Argentinean supermarket chain it acquired in 1996 was “the experience of [Norte’s CEO 
Alberto] Guil (‘the most successful manager of supermarkets and now he is with us’) and a 
group of individuals [Exxel] with solid experience in other areas, which brings very interesting 
intellectual and business complementarities” (Correa, 1996: 6). Another example of the    10 
 
improvement in managerial teams is offered by Guillermo Gotelli, Vice President of the 
Argentinean shoe and textile firm Alpargatas, who commented in a personal interview on May 
15, 1997, that “there is a now professionalization of management; executives that are 
professionals. Top managers can no longer be selected based on their last names”. One reason 
for the professionalization of management teams in family-owned firms was given by Oscar 
Vicente, Vice President of the Argentinean conglomerate Perez Companc, who jokingly 
indicated that “firms are managed by those who know more and are mismanaged by friends and 
relatives” (Estenssoro, 1992: 29). These managerial markets pressure incumbent managers to 
curb their opportunism and improve efficiency and profitability, or face being supplanted by 
alternative managers (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985), particularly in state-owned or partially-
privatized firms (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; Roland & Sekkat, 
2000). Additionally, the liberalization of labor markets helps provide incentive for productivity 
as there differential pay among managers emerges (Gersbach & Schmutzler, 2007). Firms are 
able to tie better the objectives of the manager to higher productivity and profitability through 
incentives (e.g. Jensen & Murphy, 1990, for a review see Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
Thus, in the restructuring of a white goods Argentinean firm done by the consultant Rodolfo 
Biasca “the first thing to do was to decapitate the firm: the management team was replaced, 
personnel was reduced by 20%, and then the remuneration system was replaced by one that links 
the level of salaries to profitability” (Chemi & Figueroa, 1995).  
Capital markets act as a monitor of mismanaged firms, primarily of publicly traded firms, 
in some cases substituting for imperfections of internal controls (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen, 1993). Structural reform facilitates the development of capital markets. The 
liberalization of capital markets, the privatization of firms, and the reform of pension systems    11 
 
result in the growth and deepening of capital markets (Kuczynski, 2003; Galindo, Micco, & 
Panizza, 2006). These deeper capital markets increase scrutiny over managers and limit their 
opportunism by better pricing their misbehavior in the costs of capital. Thus, partial privatization 
in Indian state-owned firms results in higher profitability, productivity, and investment as a result 
of the monitoring and rewarding functions of capital markets (Gupta, 2005). Firms that show low 
profitability face higher costs of debt and lower equity valuations, which may eventually lead to 
a takeover by other firms (Jensen, 1993). For example, in Argentina, structural reform and the 
development of capital markets led to the emergence of private equity funds, which did not exist 
before, increasing the number of takeovers. “Recent years witnessed a new phenomenon: the 
rapid change of owners in a number of firms and the emergence of operators that make money in 
these changes … In BISA, the same as in CEI, Exxel and AVP, one of the characteristics is the 
use to independent managerial groups that manage each of the firms separately. In all cases the 
main objective is to increase the profitability of the firms to later sell them.” (Borensten & 
D’Atri, 1996: 8). Juan Navarro, CEO of Exxel, explained his firm’ strategy in the following 
terms: “the business is to make the firms better, more valuable. We do not sell them if selling is 
not a good business. Before this, we seek that the firms have adequate funding, that they are 
publicly quoted … In 1990 we perceived that there was room in the market for this type of 
approach, especially after the changes that had started in Argentina which indicated a long-term 
trend; institutional investors observed Argentina with interest, and this opened the possibility of 
funding our firm … Since in every firm there is risk capital, all have to be profitable … There is 
no subsidy from one firm to another; each one has to maximize its business plan.” (Correa, 1996: 
6). At the same time, the reform of capital markets gives rise to more powerful regulatory 
agencies that scrutinize the behavior of firms and limit managerial misbehavior (Kuczynski,    12 
 
2003). Additionally, the reform of regulations that protect investors reduces managerial 
misbehavior (Djankov et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1998). As the consultant Peter Davis 
discussed in 1994, “now in the Argentinean Stock Exchange they are trying to define with more 
precision what the rights of shareholders are” (Rimuli, 1994: 152).  
The product market acts as a control mechanism on managerial misbehavior of last resort 
(Hart, 1983). Structural reform lifts government restrictions and exclusions on new entrants, 
increasing competition (Blomstrom, 1986; Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998). Product markets become 
more competitive because restrictions on imports and on foreign investors are lifted, as well as 
regulatory constraints in the industry. This provides incentives to firms to improve their 
productivity to face both new foreign and domestic competitors. “At the moment, explains Luis 
Gotelli, director of Alpargatas, we are not thinking about building new plants or expanding, but 
we have to focus our efforts in increasing global productivity, make products of international 
quality, develop new local and foreign customers, and improve the quality of managers and 
human resources. We are conscious that the country is moving towards higher competitiveness.” 
(Mercado, 1991: 19) As competition increases, managers are forced to seek improvements in 
efficiency, because firms that do not achieve minimum levels of efficiency disappear (Demsetz, 
1973). A Guatemalan businessman illustrates this idea: “If I had to define the manner to compete 
in the market with one word, this would be aggressiveness. In the international market there is no 
love or social conscience; there are profits, period” (Colburn & Sanchez, 2000: 59). Firms 
reorganize operations and reallocate effort from low to high efficiency initiatives (Eslava et al., 
2004), which improve profitability. This is illustrated by the experience of a Salvadorian poultry 
farmer: “Here, one can be successful when one is more efficient than the rest, not when one has 
more natural resources. In our company, this has meant improving the genetics, nutrition, health    13 
 
standards, management, and information, not only inside the firm, but also with our shareholders, 
suppliers, and customers. As a result, in five years we have increased the productivity of hens 
from 150 eggs per year to 320” (Colburn & Sanchez, 2000: 108).  
In sum, structural reform improves the external monitoring by managerial, capital, and 
product markets. This, in turn, reduces agency costs by limiting managerial misbehavior and 
opportunism that result in improvements in efficiency, and provide incentives for increased 
productivity, leading to increased firm profitability. Although we do not directly analyze the 
mediating mechanisms, we can formally propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: Structural reform in developing countries has a positive impact on firm 
profitability. 
Firm Type and the Impact of Structural Reform on Firm Profitability  
We also propose that the positive impact of structural reform on firm profitability varies 
across three types of firms: domestic state-owned, domestic private, and subsidiaries of foreign 
firms. Traditionally, agency theory argues that firms vary in their profitability level because they 
have different agency problems and costs, and that these costs change with ownership changes 
(e.g. Boardman & Vining, 1989; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; for reviews see Becht, Bolton, & 
Roell, 2003, and Berger et al., 2005). We extend agency theory by proposing that agency costs 
diminish with structural reform without the need for changes in ownership. Since each firm type 
faces specific agency problems, structural reform impacts them differently. Thus, firms not only 
differ in their agency costs and level of profitability, but also in how structural reform affects 
their agency costs and thus their improvement in profitability.  
Domestic State-Owned Firms. State-owned firms suffer from substantial agency 
problems of separation of ownership and control (for reviews see Lawson, 1994, and Shleifer &    14 
 
Vishny, 1994) because they are nominally owned by the citizenry (principals), but are controlled 
by politicians or by managers appointed by politicians (agents). Owners – citizens – have no 
corporate governance mechanisms to influence how managers – politicians or political 
appointees – run these firms. Citizens cannot request to have representatives on the board of 
directors or challenge management in shareholder meetings because they do not have access to 
shares; shares are held in trusts and controlled by politicians. Even when a state-owned firm is 
quoted in the stock market, politicians still control it through majority shareholdings. 
Additionally, state-owned firms are subject to competing pressures from interest groups, such as 
unions and local communities who have a nominal claim over state-owned firms, which lead to 
lobbying for transfers (Cigler & Loomis, 2006; Dixit, Grossman, & Helpman, 1997; Olson, 
1971). As a result, many state-owned firms are charged with making decisions that have little 
business value but high political benefits, such as sustaining employment or promoting the 
development of a region (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez & Hitt, 2000), 
which reduce their profitability. Their managers have little interest in restructuring, expanding or 
altering strategy radically because they have to pursue political as well as financial goals (Cuervo 
& Villalonga, 2000; Zhara, Ireland, Gutiérrez, & Hitt, 2000). Additionally, the ultimate control 
by product markets is also ineffectual. State-owned firms do not go bankrupt even when they are 
unprofitable because the politicians who run them protect them from competition (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994) and use their control of the general budget or state-owned banks to provide funds 
and a soft budget to the firms (Kornai, 1990).  
Structural reform is likely to result in large improvements in the profitability of domestic 
state-owned firms because of the large reductions in agency costs that state-owned firms    15 
 
experience with structural reform
1. As a result of structural reform, politicians are constrained in 
the way they manage not only the overall government, but also state-owned firms (Laffont & 
Tirole, 1990; Williamson, 2004). Politicians no longer can use state-owned firms for their own 
personal benefit because their use of state-owned assets is subject to higher scrutiny. As Raul 
Campos, executive manager for investor relations of Petrobras, states: “the mission and 
shareholder structure of Petrobras prevents the government from using the firm as a cash cow” 
(Schneyer, 2005: 67). Additionally, structural reform leads to a change of managers and the 
introduction of incentive mechanisms that induce managers of state-owned firms to focus on 
improving efficiency, leading to increased profitability, while the threat of privatization acts as 
an additional incentive (Vogelsang, 1990). Managers of state-owned firms are empowered to 
make more decisions that are useful to the competitiveness of the firms and fewer decisions that 
are merely politically motivated. As Fernando Bracco, President of the Uruguayan state-owned 
telecommunications firm Antel, indicated: “Today, the discussion is not on whether Antel is 
state-owned or private; the topic is whether the firm has the necessary tools to operate in a new 
environment” (Stok, 2000: 41).  
Domestic Private Firms
2. Domestic private firms in developing countries tend to be 
controlled by the founding family and have few or no shares quoted in the stock market (Booth, 
Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).  
As a result, domestic private firms suffer fewer agency problems of separation of ownership and 
                                                 
1    We do not discuss how privatization reduces agency costs and improves profitability (e.g. Boubakri, 
Cosset, & Guedhami, 2005; D'Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2005); we control for this in the analysis. Moreover, 
privatization not only results in higher profitability, but also in different behavior (Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008). 
2   Despite the perception that developing-country firms are less competitive than others, the capabilities of 
private firms are appropriate for the conditions of developing countries and help them operate profitably (Lall, 
1983). Additionally, they are adept at managing in challenging institutional conditions, which further supports their 
profitability (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Guillen, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997) and helps them to become 
multinational firms (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).     16 
 
control than other types of firms, resulting in high profitability. The family (principals) owns the 
firm and either runs it, or has professional managers (agents) running it under tight control 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). The majority shareholding enables the family to exercise 
control over management effectively to prevent their misbehavior (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Moreover, since much of the wealth of the family is tied to the firm, family owners have an 
incentive to make decisions, or to have managers make decisions, that are profitability-
enhancing. However, private firms with concentrated ownership suffer from a different agency 
problem: the problem that exists between the controlling family and minority shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The controlling family may induce the firm to act in a manner that 
benefits the family at the expense of minority shareholders (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2003). 
However, such expropriation is likely to be limited because misbehavior by the family has direct 
wealth repercussions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  
Structural reform increases the profitability of domestic private firms, but not as much as 
that of domestic state-owned firms, because of their more limited relative improvements in 
agency costs. The strengthening of national governance mechanisms that accompany structural 
reform (Williamson 2004) does not measurably alter the owner-manager agency problems 
because these are already low. Instead, they help ameliorate the agency costs between the 
controlling family and minority shareholders. Improvements in governance result in better 
protection of minority shareholders and boards of directors that are accountable to all 
shareholders, not only to majority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Khanna, Kogan, & Palepu, 
2006). Managers can no longer take solely the objectives of blockholders into account at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Instead, they increasingly need to focus on improving their 
firm’s profitability for the benefit of all shareholders. This is illustrated by Luis Echarte, CFO of    17 
 
TV Azteca, the second-largest TV operator in Mexico, who commented on the president of the 
group, Ricardo Salinas: “Ricardo is a smart man: he realized the importance of having an 
independent board. First, because the members bring a diversity of ideas, instead of having his 
friends on the board agreeing with everything he says. If he cannot convince the board that what 
he wants is a good idea, then certainly he will not be able to convince investors either” (Fretz, 
2000: 57).  
Subsidiaries of Foreign Firms. As a result of belonging to a foreign parent, subsidiaries 
of foreign firms suffer from an employment agency problem (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), in 
particular the agency problem of multiunit firms (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000), rather than the 
traditional shareholder-manager problem that other firms suffer. There is a divergence of 
objectives between managers at headquarters (principals) and subsidiary managers (agents) 
(Roth & O’Donnell, 1996) that limits profitability
3. This divergence of objectives is compounded 
by the global integration-local responsiveness challenge of the multinational enterprise (MNE) 
(Doz & Prahalad, 1984) that results in a struggle among managers (Andersson, Forsgren, & 
Holm, 2007; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Managers at headquarters are interested in operating 
subsidiaries in multiple countries to achieve the benefits of global integration that facilitate the 
success of the MNE as a whole, thus helping advance their own careers. In contrast, subsidiary 
managers are interested in managing the subsidiary in the country to achieve the benefits of local 
responsiveness and help it succeed, advancing their own careers as a result. This divergence of 
objectives generates a conflict in the mandate or strategy of the subsidiary that leads to 
inefficiencies and reduces profitability (for a review of mandates see Birkinshaw, 2001). This 
                                                 
3   Although subsidiaries of foreign firms have multiple advantages (for reviews see Tallman & Yip, 200, and 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2004), they still face challenges when operating abroad that result in lower performance 
than domestic firms (Zaheer, 1995, for a review see Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, & Manrakhan, 2007).     18 
 
idea is illustrated by Professor Franco Parisi of the University of Chile, who, commenting on the 
Spanish energy firm Endesa’s acquisition of the Chilean firm Enersys, indicated that Endesa “is 
going to centralize purchasing and financing decisions and transfer the earnings to headquarters. 
This is logical and not a sin. They paid for the right to do so” (Vera & Stok, 2000: 53). 
Additionally, subsidiary managers may waste resources promoting their advancement, obtaining 
funds for investment in projects that may be of little business value for the subsidiary but of high 
personal value, thus reducing profitability (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). 
Structural reform helps subsidiaries of foreign firms improve their profitability, but not as 
much as domestic state-owned or private firms because the agency problems faced by the 
subsidiaries of foreign firms are little impacted by structural reform. Improvements in corporate 
governance have little impact on the relationship between managers at headquarters and 
subsidiary managers; they still face divergent interests in the employment relationship. 
Moreover, structural reform may even heighten the agency problems between headquarters and 
subsidiary managers. Structural reform changes the conditions of operation. Managers in 
headquarters may not understand how structural reform is affecting the subsidiary and thus may 
not allow it to adapt to the new environmental conditions as much as managers in the subsidiary 
believe is necessary. Thus, despite structural reform resulting in the creation of policies that 
favor foreign investment (Chung & Beamish, 2005), the subsidiary may have an inappropriate 
mandate for the new environmental conditions, thus showing limited profitability improvements.  
In sum, based on the discussion of these three types of firms and on how structural 
reform affects their specific agency costs differently, we propose a relative ranking of the 
improvement that structural reform has on firm profitability. Specifically, we argue that:    19 
 
Hypothesis 2. The type of firm moderates the relationship between structural reform and firm 
profitability, such that the positive impact is greatest for domestic state-owned firms, followed by 
domestic private firms, and finally by subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
We test the hypotheses on a panel of the largest firms in Latin America from 1989-2005. 
We choose firms in Latin America because countries in this region serve as a natural laboratory 
to analyze the influence of structural reform on firm profitability in developing countries. Latin 
American countries followed an import substitution model of development until the 1980s, and 
undertook structural reform in the 1980s and 1990s (Kuczynski & Williamson, 2003; Skidmore 
& Smith, 2005), resulting in commonalities in the behavior of foreign and domestic firms 
(Grosse, 2001). We study the period 1989-2005, which covers the bulk of the transformation of 
the countries and firms in response to structural reform. The period shows variance in the level 
of structural reform across countries, which enables one to test the hypotheses adequately. 
Additionally, studying firms in Latin America contributes to the literature because this 
region has been understudied. The reviews of strategy research in emerging economies by 
Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000) and by Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng 
(2005) show that most studies focus on firms from Asia or from transition economies. A review 
of the two leading international management journals, Journal of International Business Studies 
and Management International Review, shows that less than 6% of the articles mention Latin 
America (Elahee & Vaidya, 2001).    20 
 
The database consists of the 500 largest firms in Latin America that AmericaEconomía 
magazine has compiled annually since 1989
4. The database is one of the most complete sources 
of data on firms in Latin America and has been used in other research, such as analyses of firm 
internationalization (Thomas, Eden, Hitt, & Miller, 2007) and the annual analyses of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Latin America published by the United Nations (ECLAC, various 
years). Unlike other rankings, such as Fortune 500 in the U.S., the list includes publicly-traded 
and private firms. The inclusion of private firms facilitates the generalization of the results to all 
firms rather than only to publicly-traded firms, which are a minority in developing countries 
(Booth et al., 2001), but limits obtaining additional data because private firms have lower 
disclosure requirements. As a result, we are unable to directly measure and test the theoretical 
mechanisms that link structural reform to firm profitability. The database lists the largest firms in 
Latin America by sales and provides basic accounting data on net profits, equity, assets, 
employees, exports, industry, and country of origin, an indicator specifying whether firms are 
quoted in the stock market, and a categorization of firms by majority ownership into state-
owned, private, or foreign. 
Although the use of accounting data in multiple countries creates challenges (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001), it is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 
2005; D'Souza &  Megginson, 1999, D’Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2005; Herrera & Lora, 
2005; Megginson, Nash, & Randenborgh, 1994; Micco, Panizza, & Yanez, 2007). Three 
challenges are worth noting
5. First, countries may have different reporting requirements that may 
limit the comparability of measures across countries. Second, there may be changes in 
                                                 
4    Countries that have firms large enough to appear in the AmericaEconomía database are: Argentina, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The final sample excludes firms from 
Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago because we lack a measure of structural reform for these countries. 
5   We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these possibilities.     21 
 
accounting or reporting standards, for example because of structural reform, that may limit the 
comparability of measures across time. Third, the disciplining of governments with structural 
reform may reduce their ability to appropriate wealth and thus may result in more accurate 
reporting of earnings. We think that some of the problems inherent in multi-country studies are 
reduced in the present study. First, AmericaEconomía gathers data from the firms and external 
data providers to ensure its reliability and comparability across countries. Second, we study the 
largest firms in the region, which are likely to have more complete and accurate data reported. 
Third, we focus on basic variables such as sales and net income that represent the lowest 
denominator accounting variables and thus are less subject to problems (Megginson, Nash, & 
Randenborgh, 1994). Fourth, changes in reporting standards or governmental behavior may 
result in more accurate reporting, but such accuracy will likely to apply not only the reporting of 
profits but also the reporting of losses and balance items. Moreover, using ratios absorbs this 
increased accuracy across years. Fifth, we control for year and country in the analyses, thus 
taking into account differences that may exist in the measures across time and location.  
Variables and Measures 
Table 1 summarizes the variables and measures used in the analysis. The dependent 
variable is profitability. We measure it using return on sales (ROS), a measure of profitability 
commonly used in the literature (e.g. Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000; Palepu, 1985). In 
addition, one important justification for using ROS is that the ratio includes two flow measures 
which, compared to ROA, tend to be less influenced by inflation and accounting standards 
(Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri et al., 2005).   
 
TABLE 1 
Variables, measures, and sources of data 
 
Variable Measure  Value  Source 
Profitability  Return on sales, or earnings before taxes, interest and 
depreciation divided by revenue 
Continuous  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Structural reform  Indicator of the level of structural reform undertaken 
in the country 
0 to 100  Obtained from Sahay and Goyal 
(2006) 
Foreign firm  Indicator that the majority of the firm’s capital is 
owned by investors from another country 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Domestic private 
firm 
Indicator that the majority of the firm’s capital is 
owned by private investors in the home country 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Domestic state-
owned firm 
Indicator that the majority of the firm’s capital is 
owned by the state in the home country 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Privatized firm  Indicator that the firm changed majority ownership 
from state to private or foreign firm 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Business group  Indicator that the firm belongs to a Latin-American 
business group 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Publicly-traded Indicators  that  the  firm has shares quoted in the stock 
exchange 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Sales  Total sales in millions of US$  Positive  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
GDP per capita  Gross domestic product in thousands of US$ divided 
by total population 
Positive  Computed using data from World 
Development Indicators, World 
Bank (2008) 
Openness  Exports and imports of goods and services divided by 
gross domestic product multiplied by 100 
Positive  Computed using data from World 
Development Indicators, World 
Bank (2008) 
GDP growth  Difference in gross domestic product for the year and 
the previous year divided by gross domestic product 
in the previous year 
Continuous  Computed using data from World 
Development Indicators, World 
Bank (2008) 
Industry   Indicator of the industry of the firm at the 2-digit 
NAICS level (17 industries) 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Country  Indicator of the country of origin of the firm (15 
countries) 
1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
Year  Indicator of the year of analysis (17 years)  1 or 0  Computed using data from 
AmericaEconomía (various years) 
 
The main independent variable of interest is structural reform. We measure it with the 
International Monetary Fund’s structural reform index (SRI) compiled by Sahay & Goyal (2006) 
which covers the period 1970-2005
6. It captures economic liberalization and improvements in 
                                                 
6   Several independent indices measure structural reform or related concepts. Morley, Machado, & Pettinato 
(1999), from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations, developed a 
structural reform index for Latin America covering the years 1970-1995. Lora (2001), from the Inter-American 
Development Bank, created a structural reform index for Latin America for the period 1985-1999. Gwartney, 
Lawson, and Easterly (2007) compiled the Fraser Institute’s measure of Economic Freedom of the World. It is 
available at five year intervals for 1970-2000 and annually thereafter for all countries. Kane, Holmes, and O'Grady 
(2007) created the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. It is available for the period 1995-2005 for 
all countries. Sahay & Goyal (2006) combined the indexes by Morley et al. (1999) and Kane et al. (2007) to develop 
an index that spans the period 1970-2005. We use this index because it is the only one that covers the entire period 
of interest. We tested its convergent validity against the other measures and found a high correlation.    
 
national governance, measuring the movement from high government intervention and domestic 
market protectionism toward low government control of the economy and market aperture. The 
index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values representing higher levels of structural reform.  
We are also interested in analyzing how the type of firm (domestic state-owned, domestic 
private, or subsidiary of foreign firm) affects the relationship between structural reform and 
profitability. We measure the type of firm by its majority ownership following the classification 
of AmericaEconomía
7. To test the influence of the type of firm on the relationship between 
structural reform and profitability (i.e., a moderation effect), we multiply the measure of 
structural reform by the indicator of domestic private firm, and by the indicator of subsidiary of 
foreign firm. These terms capture the impact of structural reform on profitability for each of 
these two types of firms relative to the base category, domestic state-owned firms
8. 
We control for other factors that may affect firm profitability. First, we control for the 
type of firm, because each type of firm has a baseline level of profitability regardless of the level 
of structural reform in the country. Second, we control for whether the firm has been privatized, 
because privatization reduces agency problems and improves profitability. As we indicated 
before, we do not discuss privatized firms in the theoretical development because they are not a 
type of firm ownership, but a change from one of the types to the others (i.e., from domestic 
state-owned to domestic private or subsidiaries of foreign firms); nevertheless, they are an 
important component of structural reform (Doh, Teegen, & Mudambi, 2004; Ramamurti, 2000). 
Third, we control for firm size, because firms with larger resource pools may be in a better 
                                                 
7   AmericaEconomía classifies firms by majority ownership. One of the limitations of such a classification is 
that we cannot analyze the behavior of joint ventures or any other mixed-ownership firms, such as partially 
privatized firms (Gupta, 2005; Ramamurti, 2000). We cannot obtain ownership data from alternate sources because 
a large percentage of these firms are not publicly traded. 
8   Only two variables are necessary to code a three category variable (domestic state-owned firm, domestic 
private firm, and subsidiary of foreign firm). The omitted category, domestic state-owned firm in this study, is the 
base category and the results are relative to that category (for an explanation see Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004).   
 
position to achieve economies of scale and scope and higher levels of profitability. Fourth, we 
control for whether or not a firm is publicly-traded, because such firms are under more pressure 
from financial markets to generate high profitability; this pressure may increase with structural 
reform and the transformation of capital markets. Fifth, we control for whether or not a firm is 
part of a business group, because firms that belong to business groups may benefit from such 
associations and have higher profitability (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). Sixth, we control for the 
industry, because different industries may show diverse overall levels of profitability (Caves, 
1989). Seventh, we control for the level of development of the economy, because firms in 
wealthier countries may be able to achieve higher profitability. Eighth, we control for the growth 
of the economy because the business cycle is likely to affect firm profitability (Martin & Parker, 
1995). Ninth, we control for the openness of the economy, because exposure to international 
markets may affect firm profitability. Tenth, we control for other unobserved country-level 
factors with an indicator for each country because all firms in a country may be affected by 
country-wide factors. Eleventh, we control for year because year-specific influences and events 
may affect firm profitability. Finally, we control for other unobserved firm characteristics by 
using random effects models. We do not use fixed effects models because time-invariant 
variables of interest would drop out of the analysis. Moreover, the Hausman specification test 
indicates that the random effects model is efficient because the difference in coefficients of the 
fixed and random effects models is not systematic. The chi square of the difference in 
coefficients is 25.65 with a p value of 0.53.  
Method of Analysis 
To increase the robustness of the results, we use two methods of analysis, because each 
deals with a different data challenge. First, we use a cross-sectional time-series random effects   
 
generalized least squares (GLS) model with correction for panel-specific autocorrelation AR(1) 
and for heteroskedasticity. This model therefore addresses several issues that may be inherent in 
the error structure of panel data. Second, we use a three-level random coefficient (RCM) growth 
model. Due to the time-series and multilevel nature of the data, an RCM growth model may be 
the most appropriate method to test the relationships in question. The data are structured in three 
levels as observations for each year are nested within firms and firms are in turn nested within 
countries. RCM growth models have several advantages over General Linear Model (GLM) 
longitudinal designs. An RCM growth model allows for violations of sphericity in the error 
structure and is not affected by missing data, as long as it is missing at random
9 (Ployhart, Holtz, 
& Bliese, 2002). As such, it is a more robust method for testing this type of model. Following 
Bliese and Ployhart (2002), we employed an RCM Growth Model testing sequence to construct 
the model sequentially. We began step by step by building and testing the first level model, then 
the second level model, and finally the full three-level model. We obtained an Intraclass 
Correlation [ICC(1)] for our dependent variable (ROS) of 0.43, suggesting a highly significant 
degree of nonindependence
10. In other words, 43% of the variance in ROS can be explained by 
differences among firms. We calculated ICC(1) for firms nested within countries, and found it to 
be 0.39. Hence, almost 40% of the variance in ROS can be explained by differences among firms 
for the different countries. One may therefore assume non-independence and start building an 
RCM model (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002: 380).  
                                                 
9   To rule out the possibility of data not missing at random, we ran the models using zeros for all of the 
missing observations and attained very similar results, leading to equivalent support for the hypotheses. 
10   The ICC on a dependent variable (DV) tells us how much of the variance of that variable can be explained 
by the higher level IVs (i.e. by group membership) (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Values above 0.10 indicate non-
independence of our DV and are thus desirable (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002, p. 380). ICC(1) is calculated as the ratio of 
the between-group variance in ROS to the total variance in ROS and is equivalent to a one-way random effect 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000, p. 480).   
 
We follow the guidelines for testing models in the presence of categorical moderators 
presented in Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004)
11. We grand mean center and standardize the 
continuous independent variables to reduce multicollinearity problems inherent in moderator 
models (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004; Hofman & Gavin, 1998). We lag the data one year 
because structural reform in a given year is more likely to have an impact on firm profitability 
the following year. The specification of the general model we use is the following: 
Profitabilityijkt = β0 + β1 * Structural Reformkt-1 + β2 * Structural Reformkt-1 * Domestic Private 
Firmijkt-1 + β3 * Structural Reformkt-1 * Subsidiary of Foreign Firmijkt-1 + β4 * Domestic Private 
Firmijkt-1   + β5 * Subsidiary of Foreign Firmijkt-1 + β6 * Firm Salesijkt-1 + β7 * Publicly-tradedijkt-1 
+ β8 * Business Groupijkt-1 + β9 * Privatized Firmijkt-1 + β10 * GDP per Capitakt-1  + β11 * 
Opennesskt-1 + β12 * GDP Growthkt-1 + βj * Industryjt-1 + βk * Countrykt-1 + βl * Yeart-1 + ε 
To test Hypothesis 1, we do not include the interaction terms because we are interested in 
the general impact of structural reform on firm profitability. Without the interaction terms, β1 
captures the impact of structural reform on the profitability of all firms. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported if β1 is positive and statistically significant. To test Hypothesis 2, we use the full 
model and focus on the interaction terms. The results of multivariate studies with categorical 
moderator variables should be interpreted differently than other models because the results are 
conditional (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004: 121). With the interaction terms, β1 captures the 
influence of structural reform on the profitability of domestic state-owned firms, which is the 
baseline firm type, β2 captures the impact of structural reform on the profitability of domestic 
private firms relative to the impact on the profitability of domestic state-owned firms, and β3 
                                                 
11   Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004) caution that, in the presence of unequal error variance across groups (in this 
case across firm types) the results of multivariate analyses may be unreliable. Bartlett’s test indicates homogeneous 
error variance, James’ test and Alexander’s test indicate the presence of a moderating effect, suggesting the data is 
suitable for multivariate analysis with a categorical moderator.   
 
captures the influence of structural reform on the profitability of subsidiaries of foreign firms 
relative to the influence on the profitability of domestic state-owned firms. Since Hypothesis 2 is 
expressed in relative terms, its support depends on the relative size of the coefficients. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported when, at statistically significant levels, β1 is positive, β2 and β3 are 
negative, their absolute values are smaller than β1, and β2 is larger than β3.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics and correlation matrix. Structural reform takes 
values between 19.9 and 78.0 with a mean of 44.7. However, as we standardized it to avoid 
multicollinearity problems in the analysis of interactions, the descriptive statistics show a mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Of the three types of firms in the sample, 13% are domestic 
state-owned firms, 54% are domestic private firms, and 33% are subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
The average firm has US$1.34 billion in sales and 9078 employees.  
TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
V a r i a b l e M e a n s . d . 123456789 1 0 1 1
1. Profitability 3.67 19.63
2. Structural reform 0.00 1.00 -0.10
3. State firm 0.13 0.33 0.10 -0.13
4. Private firm 0.54 0.50 0.06 -0.42 0.03
5. Foreign firm 0.33 0.47 0.01 -0.27 0.06 -0.77
6. Business group 0.23 0.42 0.05 -0.16 0.06 0.39 -0.30
7. Publicly traded 0.40 0.49 0.06 -0.14 0.14 0.29 -0.21 0.22
8. Privatized firm 0.09 0.18 -0.04 0.27 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.04 0.11
9. Sales 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 0.04 -0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02
10. GDP per capita 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.19 0.67 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.10
11. Openness 0.00 1.00 0.11 -0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.10
12. GDP growth 0.00 1.00 0.12 -0.05 0.38 0.08 -0.05 0.15 0.08 -0.08 0.13 0.18 0.17
n = 8500. Correlations not in italics are significant at 0.05 (two-tailed test).
All continuous predictors are standardized (i.e. mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1).
Summary statistics for the 17 industry variables, 15 country variables, and 17 year variables not included for the sake of brevity.    
 
Table 3 presents the results of the analyses of the influence of structural reform on firm 
profitability and how this relationship varies across firm types. Models 1, 2, and 3 provide the 
results of the random-effects generalized least squares models with corrections for panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and Models 4, 5, and 6 provide the results of the three-
level random coefficient growth models. Within each of these groups, the models are arranged 
incrementally as variables are added: the initial models (Models 1 and 4) include only the control 
variables, the next models (Models 2 and 5) add structural reform and serve to test Hypothesis 1, 
and the last models (Models 3 and 6) add the interaction between structural reform and the firm 
types and serve to test Hypothesis 2.  
TABLE 3 




Intercept -8.19 *** (1.66) -3.90 * (1.67) -2.37 (1.55) -29.04 ** (9.30) -30.50 ** (9.18) -28.76 ** (9.02)
Business group 0.31 ** (0.11) 0.06 (0.09) 0.52 *** (0.09) 0.76 (1.61) 0.83 (1.55) 0.85 (1.56)
Publicly traded 0.93 *** (0.06) 0.77 *** (0.07) 1.01 *** (0.07) 0.02 (1.10) -0.10 (1.16) -0.13 (1.14)
Privatized firm 0.18 (0.39) 0.28 (0.37) 0.44 *** (0.12) -0.12 (0.89) -0.12 (0.89) 0.53 (0.90)
Sales 0.36 ** (0.13) 0.51 *** (0.11) 0.56 *** (0.11) 0.69 * (0.31) 0.74 * (0.31) 0.67 * (0.31)
GDP per capita -2.38 *** (0.18) -2.70 *** (0.17) -2.35 *** (0.14) -2.65 *** (0.76) -3.44 *** (0.81) -2.81 *** (0.76)
Openness 1.23 *** (0.03) 1.33 *** (0.02) 1.21 *** (0.03) 1.28 *** (0.25) 1.45 *** (0.26) 1.35 *** (0.25)




Private firm 9.46 *** (0.35) 9.61 *** (0.33) 7.85 *** (0.29) 9.68 *** (1.31) 8.72 *** (1.05) 6.83 *** (1.13)
Foreign firm 8.11 *** (0.35) 8.18 *** (0.33) 6.63 *** (0.30) 7.80 *** (1.15) 6.72 *** (1.37) 5.75 *** (1.13)
Structural reform 1.94 *** (0.11) 6.02 *** (0.21) 2.33 *** (0.67) 6.42 *** (1.03)
Structural reform * private firm -4.76 *** (0.21) -4.31 *** (1.00)
Structural reform * foreign firm -5.15 *** (0.21) -5.88 *** (1.04)
Log-Likelihood -18457.59 -18486.84 -18436.19 -25272.00 -25265.25 -25249.05
χ
2 2477078 102000000 *** 4577532 *** 42.60 *** 6.75 *** 16.20 ***
n 5 8 1 0 5 8 1 05 8 1 06 0 6 36 0 6 36 0 6 3
Groups (firms) 869 869 869 1122 1122 1122
a   Base category for country, industry, and year are included in the models but their coefficients are not reported for the sake of parsimony.
b   The RCM models observations for each year as nested within firms and firms as nested within countries, so country control is unnecessary.
   The χ
2 reported is a Wald χ
2 test for models 1-3 and a log likelihood ratio χ
2 test for models 4-6.
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The results support Hypothesis 1. In Models 2 and 5, the coefficient of structural reform 
is positive and statistically significant. In other words, firms in countries with higher levels of   
 
structural reform tend to have higher profitability, on average. Since the measure of structural 
reform is standardized, we need to interpret the magnitude of the coefficient as indicating that an 
increase of one standard deviation in structural reform, on the aggregate, increases firm 
profitability by 2.33 percentage points (Model 5). As a benchmark estimation, if in 2004 firms in 
Mexico were operating at the level of structural reform that firms in Chile do, then their return on 
sales would be, on average, 4.2 percentage points higher, all else being equal. 
The results also support Hypothesis 2. In Models 3 and 6, at statistically significant 
levels, the coefficient of structural reform, which captures the influence of structural reform on 
the profitability of the baseline category of domestic state-owned firms, is positive; the 
coefficient of the interactions between structural reform and domestic private firms is negative, 
and its absolute value is smaller than the coefficient of structural reform; the coefficient of the 
interaction between structural reform and subsidiaries of foreign firms is negative, and its 
absolute value is smaller than the coefficient of structural reform; and the coefficient of the 
interaction between structural reform and domestic private firm is larger than the coefficient of 
the interaction between structural reform and subsidiary of foreign firm, with a Wald test of the 
differences between these two coefficients being statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. In 
other words, these results suggest that, on average, structural reform tends to have the highest 
positive impact on the profitability of domestic state-owned firms, followed by domestic private 
firms, and then by subsidiaries of foreign firms. As an example of how to interpret the 
coefficients, the results of Model 6 show that, ceteris paribus, with each increase of a unit in the 
standardized measure of structural reform, domestic state-owned firms improve their return on 
sales by 6.42%, domestic private firms improve their return on sales by 2.11% (6.42-4.31), and 
subsidiaries of foreign firms improve their return on sales by 0.54% (6.42-5.88).   
 
Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests 
12 
We ran several additional analyses, not presented here for the sake of brevity, to verify 
that the findings are not explained by other reasons and to corroborate the robustness of the 
results. The alternative explanations are not supported.  
First, we used alternative measures and found that they yield similar results. We used the 
Structural Reform Index from Lora (2001) and the Index of Economic Freedom from the Fraser 
Institute (Gwartney et al., 2007) as alternative measures of structural reform. We used return on 
assets, ROA
13, as the dependent variable instead of ROS. We used two indicators of firm type 
(subsidiary of foreign firm vs. domestic firm) instead of three. We ran the analyses with two 
subsamples of firms: manufacturing firms (NAICS 1-3) and service firms (NAICS 4-7). We 
controlled for firm size using measures of assets, equity, or labor in place of sales. We used GNI 
per capita instead of GDP per capita. The results of these analyses support the same conclusions. 
Second, we checked that survival bias does not explain the results. Some firms drop out 
of the database of the 500 largest companies, not necessarily because they have gone bankrupt, 
but more likely because they have not grown enough relative to others to appear in the top 500 
by sales. We took the extreme position of assuming that all the firms that disappeared from the 
analyses and do not reappear went bankrupt, and for each of these observations we attached a 
value of zero to ROS. We also ran the analyses solely on the firms that appear every year. 
Alternatively, we only included firms that appear three or more times during the period of 
analysis. None of these additional analyses alters the conclusions. 
Third, we used other methods to analyze the data. We used regression with serial 
correlation correction, regression with panel-corrected standard errors, regression with 
                                                 
12   We thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for suggesting some of these robustness tests.  
13   Although the results of the models using ROA yield equivalent support than the findings using ROS, we do 
not present them because a significant number of observations do not have information on assets in the database.    
 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, and included a lagged dependent variable to control 
for serial correlation. These results are consistent with the conclusions of the paper. 
Additionally, we analyzed whether firm type is endogenously determined and affects the 
findings. We used a two-stage instrumental variable approach. We ran the models with firm type 
as a function of sales, publicly-traded, and business group. We used the results of this analysis in 
a second equation where we ran firm profitability as a function of the interaction between 
structural reform and firm type and the other controls. This analysis yields similar conclusions. 
Fourth, we analyzed whether changes in ownership affect the findings. First, we coded 
change in ownership as a bivariate variable, assigning 1 for any firm that changes its ownership 
in the period and 0 otherwise. Second, we coded each of the changes among firm types with their 
own indicators. Third, we excluded firms that change ownership during the period of analysis. 
Again, the analyses support the same conclusions.  
Moreover, to ensure that the privatization of firms does not affect the results, we ran 
analyses with four mutually-exclusive categories of firms (privatized, state-owned, private, and 
foreign) and their interactions with structural reform. We found that structural reform has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the profitability of privatized firms, that this 
impact is lower than the positive impact on the profitability of domestic state-owned firms, but 
higher than the positive impact on the profitability of domestic private firms, followed by that of 
the subsidiaries of foreign firms. The general conclusions of the study are still supported. As we 
indicated before, we did not discuss privatized firms in the theoretical development because they 
represent a change in ownership type (i.e., from state-owned to domestic private or subsidiaries 
of foreign firms), rather than a type of firm by majority ownership. Still, this is an interesting and 
novel finding that future research may explore in more detail. Privatized firms not only increase   
 
profitability as a result of the change in ownership (e.g., Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 2005; 
D’Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2005), but also improve their profitability with structural reform 
more than other domestic private or subsidiaries of foreign firms do.  
Fifth, we studied whether individual dimensions of structural reform have a differential 
influence on profitability across firm types. We analyzed the individual impact of each of the 
five dimensions of structural reform captured in the index of structural reform for which we have 
data over the period of analysis: trade reform, financial policy reform, foreign investment reform, 
tax reform, and privatization. Results of these partial analyses show, first, that trade reform, 
foreign investment reform, tax reform, and privatization have a positive impact on the 
profitability of developing country firms on the aggregate, while the impact of financial policy 
reform on profitability is not significant. Second, when analyzing the impact of the dimensions 
of structural reform across types of firms, we find that the dimensions have the highest positive 
impact on the profitability of domestic state-owned firms and a variable influence on the 
profitability of the other two types of firms. Specifically, the influence of privatization and 
financial policy reform on profitability is highest for domestic state-owned firms, followed by 
domestic private firms, and finally for subsidiaries of foreign firms. Moreover, the impact of 
trade reform and tax reform is highest for domestic state-owned firms, followed by subsidiaries 
of foreign firms and, finally, domestic private firms. Additionally, the impact of foreign 
investment reform is highest for domestic state-owned firms than for the other two types of 
firms, with the difference between subsidiaries of foreign firms and domestic private firms not 
being statistically significant.  These are interesting findings that can be explored in more detail 
in future research.    
 
Sixth, we analyzed whether the timing and pace of structural reform affects the findings. 
A commonly-assumed expectation is that structural reform has a negative influence on firm 
profitability in the short-term but, as companies adapt to the changes, it has a positive influence 
in the long-term. We did not find evidence to support this assertion. We ran analyses with 
multiple time lags (two to seven year lags) and found that the results are in line with the ones 
presented (one year lag) in terms of signs and significance. We also ran models with the square 
of the indicator of structural reform to analyze how the influence of structural reform changes 
over time. We found that structural reform has a positive influence on firm profitability, but at a 
decreasing rate, indicating that the main benefit from structural reform occurs at the beginning 
and diminishes over time. This is an interesting finding. Finally, we analyzed whether the pace 
with which structural reform is introduced (i.e., gradually or quickly) affects profitability. We 
followed Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) and used the kurtosis of structural reform over the 
period as the indicator of pace. We found that pace of structural reform has no statistically 
significant impact on profitability and that the findings do not change.  
Finally, we analyzed whether the time of the creation of the firm affects the findings. 
Firms that were created during the import substitution period may have been established with 
technologies and operations designed for the prevailing conditions in the countries. As structural 
reform is implemented, these firms may suffer because they cannot adapt to the new conditions. 
We therefore ran two additional models: one in which we control for the age of the firm, and 
another in which we control for whether or not a firm was established after the end of the period 
of import substitution. We used firm directories (Brewin, Porter, Romiti, & Tapster 2008; Gale 
Group, 2007; Green, 2003; Mergent Online, 2007) and the firms’ official websites to obtain the 
year of establishment, and Sachs and Warner (1995) to determine the end of the period of import   
 
substitution for each country. The results show that the coefficients of age or of the indicator for 
whether or not a firm was established after the end of the period of import substitution are not 
statistically significant, while the other coefficients remain in line with the ones described.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies the impact of structural reform on firm profitability in developing 
countries. This question is part of an important debate on the benefits of globalization. The paper 
extends agency theory by arguing that structural reform improves external monitoring 
mechanisms that help ameliorate managerial misbehavior, thus reducing agency costs and 
improving firm profitability. It also argues that structural reform has a differential positive 
impact on the profitability of domestic state-owed, domestic private and subsidiaries of foreign 
firms, because their specific agency problems are impacted differently. Thus, it proposes and 
finds support for the idea that, contrary to critics of globalization, the main beneficiaries of 
structural reform are domestic state-owned firms, followed by domestic private firms and then by 
subsidiaries of foreign firms.  
The paper contributes to two literatures, one theoretical and another thematic. First, the 
paper contributes to agency theory by introducing a novel source of changes in agency costs. 
Traditional agency studies have discussed how agency costs change with changes in ownership 
(e.g., Berger et al., 2005). Here we argue that agency costs change with changes in the 
institutional environment. As such, the paper not only discusses a novel source of changes in 
agency costs, but also provides agency theory with links to its external environment. The paper 
also illustrates how agency theory can be used to explain not only the relationship between 
managers and shareholders that most researchers are familiar with (e.g., Jensen & Meckling,   
 
1976), but also other agency relationships, such as those between citizens and politicians, among 
multiple shareholders and managers, and between headquarters and subsidiary managers. 
Second, the paper contributes to the debate on the benefits of globalization (e.g., 
Bhagwati, 2004; Guillen, 2001; Henisz, Zelner, & Guillen, 2005; Rodrik, 2006) by explaining 
and providing evidence of which firms benefit from one aspect of globalization, structural 
reform. Critics of globalization contend that structural reform only benefits foreign firms and, 
therefore, developing countries should refrain from it (e.g., Mander & Goldsmith, 1996). The 
findings support the contrarian idea that domestic firms, especially state-owned ones, are the 
main beneficiaries of structural reform. Hence, policymakers in developing countries may 
consider and defend structural reform as a means of strengthening the domestic firms that serve 
as the backbone of their economy. The arguments illustrate how management-level theory, 
agency theory in our case, can help inform policymakers by explaining the mechanisms that link 
institutional changes to firm profitability.  
This line of study has some limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, the 
paper analyzes structural reform as an aggregate concept. Structural reform has multiple 
components and has been implemented differently over time. Although we ran some analyses as 
robustness checks, future studies can explain in more detail how each of the dimensions of 
structural reform affects agency costs and firm profitability, and how the timing and pace of the 
implementation of structural reform affects firms. Second, the paper focuses on developing 
countries, where state-owned, private and foreign firms coexisted before and throughout 
structural reform. Whereas the general argument that structural reform improves external 
monitoring and firm profitability is likely to apply to firms in transition economies, the specific 
discussion of who is the main beneficiary is likely to differ because private firms in transition   
 
economies did not exist before the transition, but were created as a result, and thus are likely to 
behave differently. Future research can analyze how the transition process influenced the agency 
problems and profitability of different types of firms to better understand the impact of 
institutional change on firms. Third, we test the ideas on a sample of firms in Latin America, a 
region that followed an import substitution model of economic development before embarking 
on a path of structural reform. Other countries in Africa (e.g., Egypt, Ghana) and Asia (e.g., 
India, Turkey) followed this process. Thus, the arguments presented are likely to explain the 
behavior of firms there as well, but future research can verify this. Fourth, we analyze large 
firms. Future research can analyze the behavior of small firms which, although not having the 
same ability as large firms to adapt to structural reform, may suffer fewer agency problems. 
Fifth, we study the impact of structural reform on firm profitability. Although we argue and 
show that structural reform tends to be positive for firm profitability, structural reform affects 
many other economic and social aspects that future research may address in detail. Sixth, we do 
not directly test the mediating mechanisms that link structural reform to firm profitability 
because of data limitations. Future research can measure and test these mechanisms, analyzing 
which one has a large impact on profitability improvements.  
In sum, in this paper we explain and show that structural reform has a positive influence 
on firm profitability, especially for domestic firms. This line of research not only counters critics 
of globalization and serves to guide public policy regarding structural reform, but also opens new 
avenues of research on the impact of institutional change on firm behavior and performance.     
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